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Abstract 29 
Decisions about support for therapies in light of data are made using statistical inference. The 30 
dominant approach is null-hypothesis-significance-testing. Applied correctly it provides a procedure 31 
for making dichotomous decisions about zero-effect null hypotheses with known and controlled 32 
error rates. Type I and type II error rates must be specified in advance and the latter controlled by a 33 
priori sample size calculation. This approach does not provide the probability of hypotheses or the 34 
strength of support for hypotheses in light of data. Outcomes allow conclusions only about the 35 
existence of non-zero effects, and provide no information about the likely size of true effects or their 36 
practical / clinical value. Magnitude-based inference, allows scientists to estimate the ‘true’ / large 37 
sample magnitude of effects with a specified likelihood, and how likely they are to exceed an effect 38 
magnitude of practical / clinical importance. Magnitude-based inference integrates elements of 39 
subjective judgement central to clinical practice into formal analysis of data. This allows enlightened 40 
interpretation of data and avoids rejection of possibly highly-beneficial therapies that might be ‘not 41 
significant’. This approach is gaining acceptance, but progress will be hastened if the shortcomings of 42 
null-hypothesis-significance testing are understood. 43 
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Introduction 62 
The scientific method is characterised by the formulation of theories and the evaluation of specific 63 
predictions derived from those theories against experimental data. Decisions about whether 64 
predictions and their parent theories are supported or not by data are made using statistical 65 
inference. Thus the examination of theories and the evaluation of therapies in light of data and 66 
progression of ‘knowledge’ hinge directly upon how well the inferential procedures are used and 67 
understood. The dominant approach to statistical inference is null-hypothesis-significance testing 68 
(NHST).  NHST has a particular underpinning logic that requires strict application if its use is to be of 69 
any value at all. Even when this strict application is followed, it has been argued that the 70 
underpinning ‘yes or no’ decision logic and the value of the ‘sizeless’ outcomes produced from NHST 71 
are at best questionable and at worst can hinder scientific progress (Ziliak and McCloskey, 2008, 72 
Batterham and Hopkins, 2006, Krantz, 1999, Sterne and Smith, 2001). The failure to understand and 73 
apply methods of statistical inference correctly can lead to mistakes in the interpretation of results 74 
and subsequently to bad research decisions. Misunderstandings have a practical impact on how 75 
research is interpreted and what future research is conducted, so impacts not only researchers but 76 
any consumer of research. This paper will clarify NHST logic, highlight limitations of this approach 77 
and suggest an alternative approach to statistical inference that can provide more useful answers to 78 
research questions while simultaneously being more rational and intuitive. 79 
 80 
Scientific inference 81 
With a clear picture of scientific inference, it is easier to understand the ‘fit’ of different statistical 82 
approaches to what we wish the scientific method to achieve. Science is a way of working involving 83 
formulation of theories or guesses about how the world works, calculation of the specific 84 
consequences of those guesses (i.e. hypotheses about what should be observed if the theory is 85 
correct), and the comparison of actual observations to those predictions (Chalmers, 1999). This 86 
description of the scientific method is not contentious. How observations are used to establish the 87 
‘truth’ of theories is more contentious. The nature of philosophy is such that there will never be 88 
wholesale agreement, but a philosophy of science proposed by Sir Karl Popper is generally 89 
considered an ideal to strive towards. Popper wrote that theories must make specific predictions 90 
and importantly, those predictions should be potentially falsifiable through experiment (Popper, 91 
1972b). It was Popper’s falsifiability criteria that differentiated his philosophy from the consensus 92 
approach of ‘truth by verification’ that predominated previously, while simultaneously  overcoming  93 
the problem of inductive reasoning highlighted by Scottish philosopher David Hume (Hume, 1963). 94 
In short, Popper showed that it was impossible to ‘prove’ a theory no matter how many 95 
observations verified it, but that a single contrary observation could ‘disprove’ or falsify a theory. 96 
This thesis is often explained using the ‘white swan’ example. Imagine a hypothesis that all swans 97 
are white. No amount of observations of white swans could prove the hypothesis true as this 98 
assumes all other swans yet to be observed will also be white and uses inductive reasoning. A single 99 
observation of a black (or other non-white) swan could however, by deductive reasoning, disprove 100 
the hypothesis (Ladyman, 2008). In Popper’s philosophy, scientists should derive specific hypotheses 101 
from general theories and design experiments to attempt to falsify those hypotheses. If a hypothesis 102 
withstands attempted falsification, it and the parent theory are not proven, but have survived to 103 
face further falsification attempts. Theories that generate more falsifiable predictions and more 104 
specific predictions are to be preferred to theories whose falsifiable predictions are fewer in number 105 
and vague. This latter point is particularly important in relation to NHST and will be expanded upon 106 
later. 107 
 108 
Truth, variability and probability 109 
Critics of Popper argue that, in reality, scientists would never reject a theory on the basis of a single 110 
falsifying observation and that there is no absolute truth that more successful theories move 111 
towards (Kuhn, 1996). Popper agreed and acknowledged that it would be an accumulation of 112 
falsifying evidence that ‘on balance of probability’ would lead to the conclusion that a theory had 113 
been disproven (Popper, 1972b). Herein lie two important links between statistical and scientific 114 
inference, namely that probability must be the basis for conclusions about theories because of 115 
variability in the results of different experiments on the same theory. Uncertainty is inescapable, but 116 
statistics can allow quantification of uncertainty in the light of variability. British polymath Sir Ronald 117 
Fisher first suggested a method of using probability to assess strength of evidence in relation to 118 
hypotheses (Fisher, 1950, Fisher, 1973). Fisher’s contributions to statistics include the introduction 119 
of terms such as ‘null hypothesis’ (denoted as H0), ‘significance’ and the concept of degrees of 120 
freedom, random allocation to experimental conditions and the distinction between populations 121 
and samples (Fisher, 1950, Fisher, 1973). He also developed techniques including analysis of variance 122 
amongst others. He is perhaps better known for suggesting a p (probability) of 0.05 as an arbitrary 123 
threshold for decisions about H0 that has now achieved unjustified, sacrosanct status (Fisher, 1973). 124 
 125 
Fisher’s null  126 
Fisher’s definition of the null hypothesis was very different from what we currently understand it to 127 
mean and is possibly the root cause of philosophical and practical problems with NHST that will be 128 
discussed in this paper. In Fisher’s work, the null was simply the hypothesis we attempt to ‘nullify’ or 129 
in other words ‘falsify’ (Fisher, 1973). With this understanding, he was actually referring to what we 130 
now call the ‘experimental’ hypothesis (denoted as H1) and his procedures were well aligned with 131 
Popper’s falsification approach. The conventional zero-point null hypothesis and the procedures for 132 
establishing a decision-making procedure about H0  (i.e. retain or reject) that predominate today 133 
were created by Polish mathematician Jerzy Neyman and British statistician Egon Pearson (Neyman 134 
and Pearson, 1933). Despite the p < 0.05 being attributed to Fisher as a threshold for making a 135 
decision about (his version of) H0, he was opposed to the idea of using threshold probabilities and 136 
argued vigorously in the literature with Neyman and Pearson about this (Ziliak and McCloskey, 137 
2008). Instead, Fisher argued that probability could be used as a continuous measure of strength of 138 
evidence against the null hypothesis (Fisher, 1973), a point that, despite his genius, he was gravely 139 
mistaken about. 140 
 141 
 142 
Defining probability 143 
Generally speaking, there are two interpretations of probability in statistics. The first is subjective 144 
and the second objective. Subjective probability is the most intuitive and describes a personal 145 
degree of belief that an event will occur. It also forms the basis of the Bayesian method of inference. 146 
In contrast, the objective interpretation of probability is that probabilities are not personal but exist 147 
independent of our beliefs. The NHST approach and Fisher’s ideas are based on an objective 148 
interpretation of probability proposed by Richard von Mises (von Mises, 1928). This interpretation is 149 
best illustrated using a coin-toss example. In a fair coin, the probability of heads is 0.5 and reflects 150 
the proportion of times we expect the coin to land on heads. However, it cannot be the proportion 151 
of times it lands on heads in any finite number of tosses (e.g. if in 10 tosses we see 7 heads, the 152 
probability of heads is not 0.7). Instead, the probability refers to an infinite number of hypothetical 153 
coin tosses referred to as a ‘collective’ or in more common terms a ‘population’ of scores of which 154 
the real data are assumed to be a sample. The population must be clearly defined. In this example, it 155 
could be all hypothetical sets of 10 tosses of a fair coin using a precise method under standard 156 
conditions. Clearly, 7 heads from 10 tosses is perfectly possible even with a fair coin, but the more 157 
times we toss the coin, the more we would expect the proportion of heads to approach 0.5. The 158 
important point is that the probability applies to the hypothetical-infinite collective and not to a 159 
single toss or even a finite number of tosses. It follows that objective probabilities also do not apply 160 
to hypotheses as a hypothesis in the NHST approach is simply retained or rejected in the same way 161 
that a single event either happens or does not, and has no associated population to which an 162 
objective probability can be assigned. Most scientists believe a p value from a significance test 163 
reveals something about the probability of the hypothesis being tested (generally the null). Actually 164 
a p value in NHST says nothing about the likelihood of H0 or H1 or the strength of evidence for or 165 
against either one. It is the probability of data as extreme or more extreme than that collected 166 
occurring in a hypothetical-infinite series of repeats of an experiment if H0 were true (Oakes, 1986). 167 
In other words, the truth of H0 is assumed and is fixed, p refers to all data from a hypothetical 168 
distribution probable under or consistent with H0. It is the conditional probability of the observed 169 
data assuming the null hypothesis is true, written as p(D|H).  170 
  171 
Null-Hypothesis-Significance Testing logic 172 
Based on the objective interpretation of probability, the NHST approach was designed to provide a 173 
dichotomous decision-making procedure with known and controlled long-run error rates. Neyman 174 
and Pearson were clear about this and in the introduction of their classic paper to the Royal Society 175 
stated “… as far as a particular hypothesis is concerned, no test based on the (objective) theory of 176 
probability can by itself provide any valuable evidence of the truth or falsehood of that hypothesis” 177 
(Neyman and Pearson, 1933). Instead, they set about defining rules to govern decisions about 178 
retaining or rejecting hypotheses such that wrong decisions would not often be made, but the 179 
probability of making them in the long run would be known.  180 
The starting point of the N-P approach is a pair of contrasting hypotheses (H0 and H1). For example, 181 
H0 could be that μI (population mean ankle dorsi-flexion angle given therapy �) = μC (population 182 
mean ankle dorsi-flexion angle given no therapy – i.e. control group), or to put it another way, the 183 
difference between μI and μC is zero. The alternative (H1) is then generally of the form μI ≠ μC  i.e. the 184 
population mean of the therapy and control groups will not be equal / will differ. Here we have the 185 
first philosophical issue with the conventional use of NHST. Under the philosophy of Popper, a 186 
hypothesis should be a specific prediction such that it is highly falsifiable. Popper argued a theory 187 
that allows everything explains nothing (Popper, 1972a) i.e. falsifying a null of ‘no difference’ simply 188 
allows for any magnitude of difference in any direction – hardly a severe test of a theory! 189 
Furthermore, the hypothesis under consideration (i.e. a zero-effect null) is not actually the 190 
hypothesis of interest, but is simply a straw man that the researcher does not believe or they would 191 
not be performing the experiment. Not surprisingly, Popper was not a supporter of NHST (Dienes, 192 
2008). A practical issue is also raised here. Ignoring the philosophical problem, if a null of ‘no 193 
difference’ is rejected, a question that remains is how big is the effect? It is generally the size of 194 
effect of a therapy versus a control condition / group that is of real interest, not simply that the 195 
effect is different from zero in some unspecified amount and direction.  196 
 197 
The illogic of NHST 198 
Because H0 and H1 are mutually exclusive, if H0 is rejected, by deduction H1 is assumed true and vice 199 
versa, if H0 is not rejected, H1 is assumed false. However, statistical inference and indeed science 200 
does not deal in absolute proofs, truths or falsehoods, there is always uncertainty. If this uncertainty 201 
is extended to this example, we have: If H0 then probably NOT H1, data arise consistent with H1, 202 
therefore H0 is probably false. This logic has been challenged. Pollard and Richardson (1987) 203 
highlight a flaw using the following example: ‘if a person is American, they are probably not a 204 
member of Congress; person � is a member of Congress therefore person � is probably not 205 
American’. Furthermore, Oakes (1986) points out that we are concluding the truth of H1 based on H0 206 
being unlikely, when H1 might be even less likely but we shall never know as it has not been tested, 207 
nor has the likelihood of multiple other possible versions of H1. This paradox has been called the 208 
fallacy of the transposed conditional (Ziliak and McCloskey, 2008) 209 
 210 
Errors in decision making with NHST 211 
NHST logic gives rise to two possible errors in decision making, namely, wrongly rejecting H0 when it 212 
is actually true (type I error) and wrongly retaining H0 when it is actually false (type II error). To 213 
correctly use NHST, the researcher chooses the acceptable risk of each error type in advance of 214 
testing (subjectively and according to the type of error the researcher deems more harmful). The 215 
NHST procedure ensures these error rates are fixed and controlled such that, over an infinite 216 
number of hypothetical repeats of the experiment, the probability of making each type of error is 217 
known (Neyman and Pearson, 1933). The probability of a type I error is termed α and is 218 
conventionally and without reason set at 0.05. The probability of a type II error is termed β. This 219 
error rate is less formally agreed and in the majority of research is never actually specified or 220 
controlled, violating NHST decision rules. The few studies that do control β generally specify it at 0.2 221 
giving the study an 80% chance (1 – β) of correctly rejecting a false H0, or 80% statistical power. For 222 
the type II error rate to be fixed, a minimum worthwhile / interesting effect that researchers wish to 223 
detect must be specified in advance of data collection, and an appropriate sample size calculated 224 
that provides the specified power (and thus type II error rate). Exactly that number of participants 225 
must be tested to control the type II error rate at the specified level. Failure to specify β in advance 226 
and to control it by testing an appropriately-sized sample renders decisions about H0 impossible 227 
when it cannot be rejected i.e. was the effect really likely to be zero or was it different from zero but 228 
undetectable due to low power? The only conclusion that can be drawn is one of uncertainty. Failure 229 
to test the ‘correct’ number of participants can also result in effects not large enough to be of 230 
practical / clinical importance being deemed ‘significant’ if a larger-than-necessary sample is used 231 
(i.e. the experiment is overpowered).  It should be acknowledged that, in reality, the sample sizes in 232 
published studies are rarely based on an appropriate calculation. In fact, few studies would actually 233 
take place if the estimated sample size had to be obtained, as they are often prohibitively large. This 234 
is unlikely to change, but researchers simply need to be aware that, strictly, the decision logic of 235 
NHST only applies when both error rates are actually controlled.   236 
 237 
An example of NHST in practice 238 
In the ‘therapy-versus-control-group’ example outlined in the previous section, having specified 239 
hypotheses and error rates and calculated an appropriately-sized sample, samples (assumed to be 240 
random) are taken from the hypothetical collectives of interest. The sample means for the therapy 241 
(Mt) and the control (Mc) groups and the difference between them can be calculated. The standard 242 
error of the mean difference (SEMdiff) can also be calculated. These values are used to calculate a 243 
sample statistic that combines them, in this case a t statistic, where t = (Mi – Mc / SEMdiff). In order to 244 
calculate the long-run probability that such a t statistic could occur given H0, the hypothetical 245 
collective that gave rise to this t statistic must be defined. The collective in this case is a probability 246 
distribution of t statistics from an infinite number of hypothetical repeats of the experiment 247 
assuming H0 is true (so having a mean difference between therapy and control groups of 0 and an 248 
assumed-normal distribution). This theoretical distribution represents all values of t that are 249 
probable if H0 were true. Now the decision rule is applied by defining a rejection region of the 250 
distribution where t statistics are deemed so extreme that they would occur infrequently in the long 251 
run if H0 were true. The probability of obtaining a t score in that region is equal to the predefined α. 252 
Thus, if the observed t from the sample data falls into the region of the probability distribution 253 
beyond α, H0 is rejected as such a t statistic would occur infrequently in the long run if H0 were true. 254 
Note that the interpretation of such a finding is that ‘an effect exists in the sample that should not 255 
be likely if there really was no effect in the collective sampled – therefore, there is likely to be an 256 
effect larger than zero in the collective sampled. If you find this confusing, you are not alone. Little 257 
can be concluded about the size of the effect of the therapy versus the control or the practical / 258 
clinical value of it, which is arguably much more important (Ziliak and McCloskey, 2008, Batterham 259 
and Hopkins, 2006). 260 
Note that the exact probability of the observed t is irrelevant to the decision to reject H0. It need 261 
only be less than α. The requirement for authors to report exact p values is actually redundant and 262 
stems from a mistaken belief that p is in some way a measure of strength of evidence against H0 263 
such that the lower the p the stronger the evidence against H0 and by extension for H1. It has already 264 
been discussed that p is a conditional probability of the observed data occurring assuming a fixed H0, 265 
i.e. p(D|H0), as such p is not an indicator about either hypothesis. Most researchers believe the p 266 
value tells them something about the probability of their hypothesis in light of the data i.e. p(H|D), 267 
and that the magnitude of p is in some way a continuous measure of the weight of evidence against 268 
H0, when in fact, any given p could simply be a function of random sampling variation (Cumming, 269 
2012). It is worth expanding on this point to highlight how trust in p as a form of evidence is 270 
misplaced. 271 
In the example provided, the t statistic for which p is calculated is derived from two random samples 272 
taken from hypothetical-infinite collectives. Different samples would produce different means and 273 
therefore a different t statistic and a different p value. The p value is thus a randomly-fluctuating 274 
variable that can and does jump in and out of the rejection region when an experiment is repeated 275 
exactly as before. Being so unreliable, how can a researcher possibly have trust in a p value as a 276 
source of evidence on which to base a decision about their hypotheses? (Cumming, 2012). Note also 277 
the desire for p to indicate ‘magnitude’ of evidence and effect. The importance of estimating the 278 
likely ‘size’ of an effect has been recognised as the most important goal of statistical inference but a 279 
p value is not it (Ziliak and McCloskey, 2008, Hopkins et al., 2009, Batterham and Hopkins, 2006).  280 
 281 
Size matters, but so does uncertainty 282 
The goal of statistical inference is to estimate likely ‘true / large-sample’ effects based on random 283 
samples from the collective(s) of interest. However, because different samples always produce 284 
different estimates, we must express the uncertainty of our estimates. This is achieved using 285 
confidence intervals. The exact definition of a confidence interval is debated, but it is generally 286 
accepted to be a plausible range in which the true population effect would be likely to fall with 287 
repeats of the experiment. The number of repeats is infinite and ‘likely to fall’ refers to the 288 
percentage of times a calculated interval would contain the ‘true’ effect (conventionally 95%).  In the 289 
context of the therapy-control example already used, if we repeated the experiment an infinite 290 
number of times and calculated a confidence interval each time, 95% of them would contain the 291 
‘true’ effect and 5% would not. We can never know whether the interval calculated in this study is 292 
one of those that does or does not contain the ‘true’ effect. Taking a pragmatic view however, as 293 
95% of all intervals will contain the ‘true’ effect then our interval is more likely to be one of those 294 
that does than one of those that does not. The use of interval estimation instead of NHST is 295 
becoming a necessity for publication in many journals. In fact, the International Committee of 296 
Medical Journal Editors (2010) now make the following statement in their guidelines; “quantify 297 
findings and present them with appropriate indicators of measurement error or uncertainty (such as 298 
confidence intervals). Avoid relying solely on statistical hypothesis testing, such as P values, which 299 
fail to convey important information about effect size and precision of estimates”  300 
 301 
Suppose a 95% confidence interval for the mean difference between the control and therapy group 302 
ankle dorsi-flexion angle was calculated as 1° to 10° in favour of the therapy group. A pragmatic 303 
interpretation is that the intervention is likely to result in an improvement in ankle dorsi-flexion 304 
range of between 1° and 10° more than no therapy. Assume the mean difference between the 305 
sample groups was 5.5° and that the p value of a NHST (t test in this case) was < 0.05. Using the 306 
latter, the therapy would be deeded successful, with the best estimate of the ‘true / large sample’ 307 
effect of the therapy being an improvement in ankle dorsi flexion of 5.5°. Using the confidence 308 
interval, we are still confident that there is a benefit of the therapy over the control, but the size of 309 
the improvement might be as little as 1° or as large as 10°. The confidence interval factors sampling 310 
variability into the estimate and thus expresses the uncertainty about what the true mean difference 311 
between therapy and control might be. Imagine how the discussion section of a paper might differ 312 
with the NHST and confidence-interval results. The key to the discussion section in both situations 313 
should be the context of what size of improvement in dorsi flexion is beneficial (for function, quality 314 
of life, as a return for time / cost invested in the therapy etc.) (Batterham and Hopkins, 2006, Ziliak 315 
and McCloskey, 2008). Given these factors, the conclusion might be that the benefit of the therapy is 316 
uncertain as it could be hardly beneficial at all or extremely beneficial. If a worthwhile improvement 317 
was say 1°, then the therapy is more than likely to be worthwhile, but if an improvement is not 318 
worthwhile or beneficial unless is exceeds 5°, then the conclusion will be less favourable.  Note that 319 
for a therapy to be deemed ‘successful’ with reasonable likelihood using this approach, two 320 
conditions must be satisfied: 1) the confidence interval must exclude zero and; 2) the lower limit of 321 
the confidence interval must be equal to or greater a smallest clinically worthwhile / beneficial 322 
effect. Both conditions can lead to very conservative conclusions (Atkinson and Nevill, 2001). 323 
Suppose that in the above example, a smallest-beneficial improvement was deemed to be 3°, the 324 
conclusion would have to be that the therapy is possibly of no use even though it could be very 325 
useful indeed. If the interval ran from -1° to 10°, again the conclusion would be unfavourable 326 
because not only might the true effect be no effect at all, it might also result in a worsening of ankle 327 
range, though the true effect could still be a gain in dorsi-flexion of up to a 10°, and more of the 328 
interval lies above the smallest-beneficial effect than below it! There is a real danger of throwing the 329 
baby out with the bath water. Clearly, what is required is a method that allows calculation of the 330 
likelihood of the true effect in relation to a smallest effect of clinical / practical importance. 331 
Researchers and in particular clinical practitioners make these judgements subjectively anyway, so 332 
why not incorporate them into statistical inference. There is a method for doing just this (Batterham 333 
and Hopkins, 2006, Hopkins et al., 2009). 334 
 335 
Magnitude-based inference 336 
Magnitude-based inference (MBI) involves calculating the chances (probability) that the ‘true’ effect 337 
exceeds or is less than an a priori determined smallest-worthwhile / clinical or practically-important 338 
effect. Proponents of this approach argue that the criteria of reasonable certainty adopted in the 339 
confidence interval approach is too stringent and can result in conclusions of therapies / 340 
interventions being non beneficial when in fact the likelihood of them being practically / clinically 341 
worthwhile  are extremely high (Batterham and Hopkins, 2006). Many researchers feel 342 
uncomfortable making subjective decisions about the value of the smallest worthwhile effect and 343 
argue that hypothesis testing is more scientific and objective. However, it was pointed out earlier 344 
that estimating the sample size to control type II error in a NHST-based study, requires an estimate 345 
of the smallest-worthwhile effect that is no less subjective. The choice of the smallest beneficial / 346 
clinically worthwhile effect size provides the crucial context against which the results of the study 347 
should be interpreted.   348 
Making inferences about ‘true’ effect magnitudes based on smallest-worthwhile effects facilitates 349 
more enlightened interpretations of data, though the process and the interpretation of the outcome 350 
can be more challenging. It is often easier to “inspect the p value…..and then declare that either 351 
there is or there is not an effect” (Battherham and Hopkins, 2006, p.56), but to do so might prevent 352 
new knowledge about practically beneficial therapies and restrain progress of research. Lack of 353 
knowledge of MBI need not be a barrier as the tools and instructions required to perform, interpret 354 
and present such analyses are readily available and simple to apply (Hopkins, 2000). The MBI 355 
approach is also congruent with Popper’s falsification approach whereby the expected effect of a 356 
therapy is also the smallest worthwhile / important effect for the therapy to be supported. Note that 357 
the  smallest-worthwhile effect is precise and is the effect of interest (rather than a zero-effect null), 358 
consistent with the falsification approach (Popper, 1972a). 359 
The MBI approach is gaining acceptance in some of the most popular periodicals for sport, exercise 360 
and medicine-related research (Hopkins et al., 2009, May et al., 2007, Hopkins et al., 2011). For a 361 
therapy-related example of the application of MBI in a published study, readers are referred to May 362 
et al. (2007) which examined the effectiveness of anti-inflammatory gel application in the treatment 363 
of wrist tenosynovitis in kayakers. In addition to the fictional ankle dorsi flexion example described 364 
above, the study helps to further demonstrate the practical application of the MBI approach. 365 
 366 
Conclusions 367 
Significance testing is a procedure for making black and white decisions about zero-effect null 368 
hypotheses with known and controlled long-run error rates. Type I and type II error rates must be 369 
specified in advance and a required sample size calculated and tested to ensure type II error rate is 370 
controlled at the specified level. The outcome allows conclusions about the likely existence of non-371 
zero effects but provides no information about the likely size of true effects or their practical / 372 
clinical value. The approach is also at odds with accepted philosophies of science. 373 
To estimate the true size of an effect and its likelihood in relation an effect magnitude of practical / 374 
clinical importance, magnitude-based inference provides the solution. The approach is gaining 375 
acceptance and progress will be hastened if researchers appreciate the shortcomings of traditional 376 
NHST. It is recommended that researchers begin to incorporate the subjective-clinical judgements 377 
commonly made in light of experimental data, and expressions of uncertainty, into their inferential 378 
statistical analysis. This will ensure more considered and enlightened interpretations of data and 379 
avoid discounting possibly highly practically / clinically beneficial treatments because they are not 380 
statistically significant. 381 
 382 
Key points 383 
Even used properly, NHST only gives yes / no decisions about zero-effect null hypotheses which are 384 
always false and of no interest anyway. 385 
Estimates of the size of true / large sample effects in NHST do not encompass uncertainty due to 386 
sampling variation. 387 
Outcomes of NHST are without context of what is clinically / practically important. 388 
Statistical inference should estimate the likely size of true effects using confidence intervals. 389 
Confidence intervals should be interpreted relative to a priori specified clinically / practically 390 
worthwhile effect magnitudes. 391 
Probabilities of true effects in relation to clinically / practically worthwhile effects should form the 392 
basis for interpretation of experimental data. 393 
 394 
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